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Does God exist? Does it make sense to believe in a God who is the creator and 
“Grand Organizing Director” of the physical cosmos?1 Does cultural relativism and 
religious pluralism discount the supposed truths that religious believers claim to 
know? Are the speculations of theoretical physicists about the apparent intelligence 
underlying the structure of physical reality more likely to be true than the claims of 
religious believers? 
 
These are the kinds of hypothetical questions that rise naturally from the assumed 
philosophy of religion underpinning modern Western culture. In our culture, it is 
natural for us to play with “God” as an abstract hypothetical idea tied back to 
scientific theories about the origin and order of the physical cosmos.2 Further, if we 
do not find this tie back to a physical cosmology rationally or empirically convincing, 
then naturally enough, we tend to not find it reasonable to believe in God. But, if we 
did not have the assumed philosophy of religion that we do, the very questions that we 
typically ask about “God” and the type of approaches we naturally take to answering 
those questions may well make no sense at all. 
 
Western culture has not always had the assumed philosophy of religion that we now 
have. According to Paul Tillich, we experienced a seismic culturo-conceptual shift in 
the 13th century, and the dominant philosophy of religion that emerged in 
Christendom after that time underpins some of the most basic assumptions and 
behavioural patterns of the modern Western life form to this day.3 So now, when our 
way of life is arguably taking serious buffets on many fronts, the substrata of our 
assumptions about ultimate meaning may also be exposed and up for serious re-
examination. Insightful observers of our times have persuasively argued that: the 
modern and Western way of thinking is being intellectually corroded by 
postmodernism;4 the modern and Western way of living is being physically corroded 
by the enormous power of our instrumental rationality;5 the modern and Western way 
of believing is being spiritually corroded by an implicit ontological nihilism;6 and 
traditional Western ways of moral relating are being communally corroded by the 
growing inequalities and fears inherent in our politically imposed materialistic and 
agonistic success values.7 In the light of these problems, those who feel these 
corrosive effects most keenly are trying to perform some very deep adjustments 
regarding what the basis of our understanding of meaning in Western culture is and 
should be. 
                                                 
1 The “Grand Organizing Directorate” is an internet “fuzzy logic” hypothesis – see 
http://ww.cs.bris.ac.uk/Research/MachineLearning/IntelligentSystems/ISSMartin.pdf    
2 Davies, P., The Mind of God, Penguin, London, 1993 
3 Tillich, P., A History of Christian Thought, SCM Press, London, 1968, pp 198 – 201  
4 Lyotard, J-F., The Postmodern Condition, Manchester University Press, 1984  
5 Mason, C., The 2030 Spike, Earthscan, UK, 2003  
6 Casey, M.A., Meaninglessness, Freedom Publishing House, North Melbourne, 2001 
7 Pusey, M., The Experience of Middle Australia, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2003 
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I confess to being discontented with what I read as the nihilistic and agonistic 
trajectories of contemporary Western culture. Hence, in this essay I attempt to explore 
what I regard as the most basic conceptual structure about ultimate meaning 
underpinning any given culture – its assumed philosophy of religion – in order to 
envision a conceptual reformulation for our culture grounded in beliefs that do not 
lead to nihilism and agonism.8 In this attempt I will seek to tie in the theological 
ontology of Paul Tillich with Polanyian personalist epistemology and with the current 
post-secular interest in Augustine and Aquinas associated with Radical Orthodoxy. 
 
It is important to note from the outset that the scholarly foundation of this paper is 
Paul Tillich's understanding of the archetypal belief paradigms in the philosophy of 
religion that he believes so powerfully shape Western cultural history. The sketches of 
Augustine and Aquinas that are central to the case I put forward are drawn directly 
from Paul Tillich’s work; they are pictures of how I understand Tillich to see 
Augustine and Aquinas.9 Tillich was a great Latin scholar with an intense interest in 
the theology of the Middle Ages, as he saw it as foundational to the deepest structures 
of belief that underpin contemporary Western culture. However, whether Tillich was 
right or not about a fundamental tension between Augustine and Aquinas is a question 
I do not explore in this paper, although it is a question that I believe warrants very 
close examination.  
 
It is also important to note that I am reading Tillich's Augustinian philosophy of 
religion in a personalist manner. Personalism is a philosophical movement that has, I 
believe, some real epistemological answers to what it is that is conceptually mistaken 
about post/modern Western culture. Yet in this essay I will contend that personalism 
that is only clear on questions of knowledge, but that is indecisive on questions of 
being, is still inadequate. In this essay I will put forward the notion that a fully 
personalist philosophy is both epistemologically and ontologically personalistic, as in 
Augustine; I will endeavour to describe some of the intellectual strengths of 
Augustinian personalism; and I will suggest that Augustinian personalism is a viable 
contemporary alternative to the prevailing impersonalism in Western culture. I will 
also query the extent to which Aquinas is useful in challenging the norms of 
modernist truth and secular reason. This query is my Tillichian attempt to ping a little 
critical pebble over the bows of what I consider to be the most fascinating theological 
movement of our times, Radical Orthodoxy.10 
                                                 
8 My essay is an attempt to re-contextualised and re-tell Paul Tillich's essay "Two Types of Philosophy 
of Religion" (see footnote 14) in which the idea that philosophy of religion is the bed rock of our 
conceptualisation of meaning in culture is implicit. More recently John Milbank in his Theology and 
Social Theory (Blackwell, Oxford, 1990) also strongly argues a tight genealogical case for the primacy 
of theology (alas, mostly bad theology) in the pivotal political, intellectual, artistic and scientific 
developments of Western culture.    
9 Tillich, P., Theology of Culture, Oxford University Press, 1964; A History of Christian Thought, SCM 
Press, London, 1968; Systematic Theology, Vol 1., James Nisbet & Co., London, 1968. 
10 I agree entirely with the basic premise of Radical Orthodoxy which is that Western culture is in a 
state of malaise as a result of underlying weaknesses in its unconscious theological beliefs. Digging 
down into the primary theological minds that have constructively inspired Western culture (Augustine 
and Aquinas) in the context of the contemporary postmodern rejection of modernist truth and 
Enlightenment secularism, Radical Orthodoxy seeks to forge a theologically viable way forward for 
Western culture. Hence, Tracey Rowland, for example, puts forward the notion of "postmodern 
Augustinian Thomism" (Rowland, T., Culture and the Thomist Tradition, Routledge, London, 2003) as 
providing us with a theological metanarrative capable of revitalising Western culture at its spiritual 
heart. In line with Tillich's argument, I am not yet convinced that Aquinas and indeed Aristotle are not 
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We commence by examining the difference between personalism in epistemology and 
personalism in ontology. 
 
 
I.  Two Types of Personalism 
 
Personalist epistemology sees the human knower as an interested being whose mode 
of existence and whose every belief is essentially interpersonally situated. As no 
knowledge exists except as had by a personal knower, no knowledge is impersonal 
and no knowledge is finally independent of the matrix of relationships and beliefs in 
which our personhood, language and cultural heritage is essentially embedded.11  
 
Personalist ontology, however, is not necessarily adhered to by personalist 
epistemologists. In personalist ontology – as in Augustine – reality itself, not just the 
human knower, is seen as personally embedded. This is an intrinsically theistic 
ontology, which is why there is no meaningful distinction between theology and 
philosophy in Augustine.12 Though Augustine may seem to be buried a long way 
down in the history of Western culture, one can still find impressive recent advocates 
of his personalist ontology. Václav Havel captures this type of outlook well in his 
famous essay “Politics and Conscience.”13 
 
Yet ontological personalism, though it has its contemporary advocates, is a cultural 
anomaly. An impersonalist and unconsciously atheistic ontology is now deeply 
embedded in the Weltanschauung typically accepted in contemporary Western 
culture. This being the case, what is taken as obvious by Augustine – particularly our 
personal and immediate participation in God – seems axiomatically absurd to the 
normal operational assumptions of our cultural life form. We are accustomed to 
seeing God as discrete from our being and as a cosmological hypothesis that is both 
functionally and theoretically extraneous to our daily lives. But in Augustine, God is 
the immediate and ever present ground of our very being as persons in the world, and 
the grounds of all reality. God, in Augustinian ontological personalism, cannot be a 
cosmological hypothesis. 
 
Impersonalist epistemology ignores the personal realities in which knowledge is 
embedded, as if we have an autonomous faculty of reason, and as if our sensory 
faculties autonomously present basically reliable objective data to our autonomous 
thinking "I". Impersonalist ontology assumes that reality is not grounded intimately in 
the very being of God, but that reality is "objective", essentially impersonal, and "out 
                                                                                                                                            
in the end deeply formative of the thought structures that became modernist truth and Enlightenment 
secularism. Hence, as deep and profound a theological thinker as Aquinas is, I think Radical Orthodoxy 
would more powerfully critique modernist truth and Enlightenment secularism if the differences rather 
than the similarities in Augustine and Aquinas were more deeply explored, and if Augustine was given 
primacy over Aquinas in those differences. 
11 Polanyi, M., Personal Knowledge, University of Chicago Press, 1962 
12 See also the great Thomistic Jesuit, Copleston, F., Medieval Philosophy, A History of Philosophy, 
Vol II, Continuum, London, 2003, pp 47 – 48: “[Augustine’s] mingling of theological and 
philosophical themes may appear odd and unmethodical to us today, used as we are to clear distinctions 
between the provinces of dogmatic theology and philosophy; but one must remember that Augustine, in 
common with other Fathers and early Christian writers, made no such clear distinction.” 
13 Havel, V., (ed. Wilson, P.,) “Politics and Conscience” (1984), Open Letters, Vintage Books, USA, 
1992, pp 249 - 271 
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there" discrete from our consciousness of it. What Tillich sees as the assumed 
"cosmological philosophy of religion" indigenous to nominalist grounded Western 
culture, implies impersonalism in both epistemology and ontology. Conversely what 
Tillich calls the Augustinian "ontological philosophy of religion" implies personalism 
in both epistemology and ontology. 
 
A personalist reading of Tillich opens up the idea that it is our "cosmological 
philosophy of religion" that underpins the deep seated and simply assumed 
impersonalist norms of Western culture. This "cosmological philosophy of religion" 
must be exposed as wanting if the very categories of Augustinian personalism are to 
be even comprehensible to us. Tillich, as an Augustinian Lutheran, has sought to 
critically expose the "cosmological philosophy of religion" assumed in modern 
Western culture, and if one finds his argument convincing, Tillich’s work in this area 
is of great cultural importance. 
 
 
II. Two Types of Philosophy of Religion, and Western culture 
 
In 1946 Paul Tillich wrote an essay titled “The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion” 
wherein he distinguishes between ontological and cosmological philosophies of 
religion.14 
 
According to Tillich, an ontological philosophy of religion understands God as 
someone from whom one is estranged, but from whom one “never has been and never 
can be separated.”15 Tillich locates Augustine as the great exponent of this ontological 
philosophy of religion in Western culture. Here, our very existence as human persons 
is at all times totally dependent on God, in whose Personhood and Being we 
participate. Hence we are known by God, and can know God, with greater immediacy 
than we know any sensory perception or rational truth, and God’s reality is more basic 
to our own being than even our self and relational awareness. To Augustine, this is 
true whether we like it or recognise or not. The realism of the Middle Ages – where 
God is understood as the grounds of all reality, and where all that is not good, 
beautiful and true is perversely estranged from God – is steeped in this philosophy of 
religion.  
 
Metaphysics grounded in an ontological philosophy of religion is not about seeing 
through the mirage of appearance and superstition with abstract reason or scientific 
thoroughness, in order to find the cold, hard truth about objective reality. Rather, 
metaphysics is the insight of true wisdom known only by participation in divine truth; 
metaphysics is true theology. True theological knowledge is attained by the personal 
reception of the grace of God (who is the ground of reality) revealing His essentially 
personal and intrinsically meaningful self directly to us via our unavoidable 
participation in reality as persons. This revelation enables us to understand the true 
meaning of all reality. There is no nature and supernature as such in Augustinian 
metaphysics, for all nature is essentially transcendently grounded. 
 
                                                 
14 Tillich, P., Union Seminary Quarterly Review, I, 4, May, 1946. This essay is reproduced in a 
collection of Tillich essays titled Theology of Culture (Oxford University Press, 1964, pp 10 – 29) from 
which I quote. 
15 Tillich, P., Theology of Culture, Oxford University Press, 1964, p 10 
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In contrast, Tillich maintains that the cosmological philosophy of religion views, in a 
nominalist manner, both human and divine persons as autonomous individual entities. 
To this outlook all persons, including God, exist as essentially self contained beings 
who can only know each other indirectly through reason and the senses (apart from 
the participatory internal relations of the Trinity). The nominalists rejected the 
immediate participatory dependence of human being on the divine Being of God and 
set about mapping the cosmos in terms of what could be known by autonomous 
human reason and perception, as complimented by a separate category of divinely 
revealed truths that must be blindly and unquestioningly believed. Thus deference to 
the authority of the church to tell us truths about God we could know no other way 
becomes the knowledge of faith, and thus the knowledge of faith and the knowledge 
of reason are methodologically and ontologically delineated. This is the beginning of 
secular reason. Yet, at this birth of secular reason the nominalists expected that there 
would be a neat coalescence between the super-rational authority of the church and 
the rational and empirical authority of our ‘natural’ epistemological powers. 
 
As significant as nominalists like William of Ockham and Duns Scotus were in 
dislodging Augustinian personalist ontology from its place of eminence in Western 
culture, Tillich notes how important Aquinas' Aristotelian epistemology is in 
furthering the cosmological philosophy of religion. Whilst Aquinas did not reject 
Augustinian ontology in doctrine (see Summa Theologica I,8,1), Tillich maintains that 
Aquinas did reject any significant and any ordinary role for Augustinian personalist 
epistemology in the realm of sapientia.16 To Augustine, true knowledge of reality can 
be known, and can only be known, via personally immediate divine illumination, as 
received by those who in faith and humility are open to God.17 And this relational 
faith and this humble participation in the mind of God is the essence of the knowledge 
of truth and the very mode of our participation in reason; faith is here in no way 
separate from or partnered to ‘natural’ reason, and reason here is not seen as some 
power or faculty of the autonomous human mind. Aquinas, in contrast, allows our 
natural sensory faculties to point towards (but never attains) the knowledge of God 
via the mediacy of human perception and logic, as we seek to probe God's effects, 
though we do not directly know His Person by natural revelation. Aquinas is not 
limited to the knowledge of natural revelation however, and he applies his powerful 
mind to the tools of Aristotelian logic in order to reasonably understand the “special” 
revealed truths handed to him by the super-natural and unquestionable authority of the 
church. Aquinas holds that the content of special revelation is beyond, but never 
contradicted by, the feeble scope of what our logic and the senses can know.  
 
Tillich maintains that Aquinas’ application of Aristotelian epistemology to natural 
revelation and his application of Aristotelian logic to special revelation covers all 
categories of knowledge and reason in a way that excludes the direct personal 
knowledge of the Divine Grounds of our being, which is the only true ground of all 
knowledge, belief and reason in Augustine. Hence it is Aquinas who "cuts the nerve 
of the ontological approach."18 After the 13th century nominalist impersonalism and 
Aquinan epistemological and logical categories worked together to almost completely 
                                                 
16 In Augustine, sapientia is wisdom, knowledge of true ends, and is known via divine illumination as 
one encounters God, unmediated, in the grounds of one’s own being. 
17 Nash, R.H., The Light of the Mind: St Augustine's Theory of Knowledge, The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1969 
18 Tillich, P., Theology of Culture, Oxford University Press, 1964, p 17 
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replace the Augustinian ontological philosophy of religion with the cosmological 
philosophy of religion characteristically implicit in modern Western culture to this 
day.  
 
Metaphysics grounded in this cosmological philosophy of religion that emerged after 
Aquinas is all about the creation of a logically necessary conceptual map – a 
cosmology – of what can be known to the thinking substance of the individual human 
mind about universal verities within the natural world, and via the authority of special 
revelation, of logically necessary features of supernatural reality beyond the apparent 
world. Moving forward from the thirteenth century, this cosmological philosophy of 
religion and its ideas of metaphysics, the nature of the individual and the impossibility 
of direct participatory knowledge of God,19 settled down deep into the conceptual 
assumptions of Western culture. In the 17th Century, for example, Descartes took the 
autonomy of human consciousness as given and the methods of valid natural 
knowledge as only indirect (reason and senses) in a manner foundationally shaped by 
this cosmological philosophy of religion. Hence modern Western culture, with its 
science, its concept of society, freedom, knowledge and power, and its concept of self 
and God, arises from the Western cosmological tradition of the philosophy of religion. 
It seems that theology deeply shapes culture.20 
 
The question of the existence of God cannot seriously arise within an ontological 
philosophy of religion – for it is simply a meaningless question. To ask whether God 
exists or not is to assume that meaninglessness is an ontological possibility, which is 
contradicted by our asking an ontological question at all and by the reality which 
grounds our very existence as persons and makes it possible for us to participate in 
meaning and reason. Further, within an ontological philosophy of religion the means 
of knowing God is not mediated by reason or the senses but is immediately 
apprehended by the personal essence of my being. In sharp contrast, for the 
cosmological approach what is knowable about God becomes an object of my 
reasoning (a construct of my mind) and this idea can be tested against my merely 
probable sensory apprehension of the cosmos. Where I believe that my autonomous 
mind is the final authority for the credibility of all knowledge (for I have no direct 
contact with anything else), and its categories of judging the truth or falsity of any 
idea presented to it are purely rational and empirical, then any reason I have for 
believing in the existence of any ratio-empirically intangible entity, such as God – but 
also personhood, the human spirit, love, beauty, goodness and meaning itself – 
becomes inherently flimsy. Hence, it is Tillich’s contention that since the thirteenth 
century the cosmological philosophy of religion has made “atheism not only possible, 
but almost unavoidable”21 in Western culture. 
 
One of the most vivid utterances expressing the atheistic end point of the Western 
cosmological philosophy of religion is attributed to the great French mathematician 
                                                 
19 Nominalist thought allowed for participatory knowledge of God, but only as discretely found in the 
religious domain, and as mediated to the believer by those endowed with the authority of the church, in 
the Eucharist. Ordinary and holistic participatory love/knowledge of God in daily life – something the 
early fathers like Origin, and also Augustine, knew as the grounds of all other love/knowledge in all 
spheres of life – is just not consciously there anymore in the thought structures of Western culture by 
the time of Descartes. 
20 Again, see Milbank, J., Theology and Social Theory, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, for a strong 
genealogical argument supporting this idea.  
21 Tillich, P., Theology of Culture, Oxford University Press, 1964, p 18  
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Laplace. Napoleon in quizzing Laplace about his understanding of the origins and 
stabilising forces of the physical cosmos, asked him whether his cosmology should 
have a place for God. Laplace replied simply that he had “no need of that 
hypothesis.”22 Enlightenment physical cosmology, the logical end point of the 
Western cosmological philosophy of religion, pursues knowledge and understanding 
from a set of criteria that cannot directly know God. Further, understanding the 
cosmos only in terms of what Enlightenment physical cosmology supposedly can 
rationally and empirically know, such an outlook does not need any super 
cosmological entity to start reality, to give reality its rationality, to give us meaning, 
or to grasp or even point to anything beyond or beneath our knowledge of the 
empirical and the rational.  
 
Philosophy of religion is the most primary building material of any cultural edifice, 
for it is the foundation upon which all our beliefs about meaning and ultimate concern 
are built.23 Given the assumed cosmological philosophy of religion underlying both 
the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, an assumed impersonalist nominalist concept 
of the self, and an assumed impersonalist Aristotelian concept of valid thought and 
knowledge is implied. Hence, God’s place in our belief system becomes a 
cosmological hypothesis, and, in that place, He also becomes a logically and 
empirically extraneous cosmological hypothesis. This outlook makes atheism, secular 
reason and public indeterminacy about ultimate concern seem eminently reasonable to 
us. Theism premised on this cosmology becomes an act of voluntarist free belief, and 
the extraneousness of this hypothetical cosmological God is assumed by such theism. 
However, apologetics premised on a theistic cosmological philosophy of religion 
often seeks to persuade people that the cosmological hypothesis of God, though not 
provable by the categories of reason or empirical knowledge alone, is even so not 
extraneous, for both subjective psychological reasons and for objective cosmological 
reasons. Somehow, just believing in the existence of God (and of the Christian God 
specifically) in the face of His extraneousness, as if mental assent to the theistic 
cosmological model is the crux of faith, is an underlying concern in modern religious 
apologetic appeals to Secular Man. So deeply embedded is the cosmological 
philosophy of religion is contemporary Western culture that epistemological and 
ontological impersonalism are often as firmly assumed in modern Western 
Christianity as they are in modern Western agnosticism and atheism. 
 
But the picture is more complex that this. Whilst impersonalist epistemology and 
impersonalist ontology combine to form the dominant mode of modern Western 
cosmological thinking, three other combinations in personalism and impersonalism in 
ontology and epistemology are open to us. It seems to me that as we have tried to 
work our way out of the failures of modernism, we have not yet come to embrace the 
only finally credible alternative to the double impersonalism in both epistemology and 
ontology that underpins our culture; we have not yet embraced personalism in both 
epistemology and ontology. 
                                                 
22 See webpage by Cabillon, J.G.,  “Laplace, Napoleon, God”, http://mathforum.org/epigone/math-
history-list/terdquergan  
23 I maintain that religion itself is more primary than our thoughts about religion to meaning in culture, 
and that God is more primary than our religion. But in terms of how we construct culture in giving 
conceptual content to our most basic beliefs, the way we think about religion, and the way we believe 
in or disbelieve in God, is basic to all other meanings about ultimate concern and the meaningful ends 
of our culturally specific way of life. 
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III.  Four onto-epistemological outlooks 
 
Impersonalism in both epistemology and ontology 
 
Descartes, the father of the modern scientific method, was an impersonalist in both 
epistemology and ontology.24 Whilst he needed God as a metaphysical insurance 
policy for the connection of his solipsistic rationalism with objective physical reality, 
the atheism of Laplace traces its roots directly from the notion of truth implicit in the 
cultural history of mathematics and empirical investigation that Descartes initiates. 
With Tillich, I believe impersonalism in both epistemology and ontology implies at 
least agnosticism, and makes atheism a rational faith very much at home in our 
intellectual culture. Yet with Polanyi, I maintain that impersonalist epistemology is 
intellectually untenable. Further, I maintain that impersonalist ontology without a 
grounding in the notion of truth upheld by impersonalist epistemology is an entirely 
arbitrary belief position with no innate or objective justification. So to the other three 
options. 
 
Personalism in epistemology with no explicit personalist ontology 
 
Michael Polanyi makes up all the ground Descartes leaves out in terms of how we 
know anything, and scientific things in particular. Yet his political liberalism and the 
vibrant truth seeking side of Polanyi’s philosophy of science also carries him down 
the road of Enlightenment secularism, which in practise tends to bracket off questions 
of ultimate meaning from public knowledge.25 Further, so ontologically inadequate is 
most modern Western religious doctrine - as it needs to be in order to fit comfortably 
with the frame of Enlightenment secularism - that Polanyi may have had little 
exposure to a vibrant Christian ontological personalism.26 For whatever reason, 
Polanyi cannot bring himself to be decisive about ontology.27 This causes his thought 
some serious difficulties. Polanyi is committed to the process of knowledge being 
culturally encapsulated, and so Jacobs can demonstrate very effectively that Polanyi is 
a tacit cognitive relativist; yet Polanyi maintains that he is committed to absolute and 
unitary truth.28 In Augustinian terms, it seems reasonable to believe that culturally 
encapsulated personalistic knowledge can be true in a manner that transcends culture, 
provided culture and nature are both ontologically grounded in a personal and 
knowable Ground Of Reality. But Polanyi cannot link the relativist implications of his 
epistemological work to any specific ontological anchor in which all culture is 
                                                 
24 Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch, (trans), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Cambridge 
University Press, 1985 
25 Freedom and truth are rightly valued by Enlightenment secularists. However, freedom and truth can 
be politically and ecclesiologically configured in such a way as to enable greater integration of the 
private and the public and the sacred than the nominalistic concept of the independent spheres permits. 
Enlightenment secularism rests upon this nominalistic separation of spheres. Yet, to find problems with 
Enlightenment secularism does not preclude one from upholding freedom and truth, even though the 
assumptions of Western secular liberalism now have a very hard time conceiving of such a stance. 
26 Though I understand that Polanyi and Tillich did meet in 1963, and had a great respect for each 
other's work. 
27 Allen, R., Transcendence and Immanence in the Philosophy of Michael Polanyi and Christian 
Theism, Rutherford House, Edinburgh, 1992; Jha, S.R., Reconsidering Michael Polanyi's Philosophy, 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002;  Mullins, P., "M. Polanyi 1891 - 1976", 
http://www.deepsight.org/articles/polanyi.htm  
28 Jacobs, S., “Michael Polanyi, Tacit Cognitive Relativist”, The Heythrop Journal, October 2001, vol. 
42, no. 4, pp 463-479  
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embedded that would enable all ‘language games’ to be interconnected and 
universally undergirded by the ontology of meaning itself (ie Logos).29 Polanyi wants 
truth to remain culturally encapsulated and yet be released from fundamental cultural 
relativism, but, out of theological shyness, he cannot bring himself to be committed to 
any specific theological ontology capable of doing this. In this area, Polanyi’s work is 
subject to serious incoherence. And if Tillich’s wonderful insight that “every 
epistemology contains and implicit ontology” is accepted,30 then Polanyi’s failure to 
uphold a decisive personalist ontology leaves serious holes in his otherwise profound 
and wide ranging work. 
 
Personalism in ontology and impersonalism in epistemology31 
 
Aquinas in seeking to synthesise Platonic Augustinianism with his own Christian 
Aristotelianism endeavours to keep the theological ontology of Augustine whilst 
marrying it to a more natural-revelation-friendly Aristotelian epistemology. It is 
Tillich’s contention that the marriage does not work and critical ordinary features of 
Augustinian unmediated ontological knowledge are lost by Aquinas in this process. 
Aquinas tries to overcome the Platonic “dualism” of Augustine where personal 
spiritual knowledge, sapientia, and impersonal natural knowledge, scientia, are in 
important regards discontinuous.32 The effect as Tillich sees it is that all knowledge in 
Aquinas is characterised in Aristotelian terms and is divided into natural revelation, 
the rational theology of special revelation, or as super-rational mystical experience. 
Sapientia as Augustine understands it is now mediated to the believer (rather than 
immediately personally known) through the church in the theological categories of 
scientia. In Augustine’s “mystical realism”33 there is a direct though exclusively grace 
enabled “theonomous character to the immediate world”.34 To Augustine all that is 
real, as seen by the eyes of faith, is an intelligently mystical revelation of the very 
person of God. This immediacy, height and saturation of revelation for the believer is 
absent from Aquinas, and so the unmediated knowledge of God through all things in 
the ontological philosophy of religion is dogmatically retained but existentially lost. 
 
Tillich maintains that Aquinas’ ontology is undermined by his Aristotelian 
epistemology as his synthesis of Plato and Aristotle fails to join Platonic revelation 
with Aristotelian science, to the detriment of the immediate, personal, ordinary and 
intelligent existential knowledge of the divine Person speaking to us and holding us 
through all things. This puts Aquinas in a strangely similar but inverted position to 
                                                 
29 See the doctrine of Logos perused by Heraclitus, Philo of Alexandria, and particularly, in relation to 
Augustine, Saint John in John 1:1-18 
30 Tillich, P., Systematic Theology, Vol 1., James Nisbet & Co., London, 1968, p 23 
31 To use Aquinan influenced scientia as an illustration of “impersonalist” epistemology requires a bit 
of careful explanation. As Tillich’s understanding of the epistemological implications of Aquinas’ 
thought is critical to his genealogical case about the rise of the cosmological philosophy of religion in 
Western culture, an attempt at such explanation cannot be avoided. See appendix one. 
32 In Augustine, scientia is knowledge derived both from the senses and from intellectual intuition of 
universals. Scientia is practical and instrumental knowledge which also has a theoretical component. 
Sapientia, to re-iterate, in contrast to scientia, is wisdom, knowledge of true ends, and is known via 
divine illumination as one encounters God, unmediated, in the grounds of one’s own being. 
To Augustine scientia informed by sapientia is science that is directed by a good end. However, 
scientia cannot inform sapientia in that good science cannot tell one the propositions of wisdom. 
33 Tillich, P., A History of Christian Thought, SCM Press, London, 1968, p 198 
34 Tillich, P., ibid, p 117; see also pp112-117, pp198-201 
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Polanyi, where Aquinas is committed to ontological personalism, but his 
epistemology and his understanding of ecclesial authority cannot coherently allow it. 
 
Personalism in both epistemology and ontology  
  
Augustine unifies epistemology with ontology by assuming an isomorphic 
relationship between the ontology of reality in which our being participates, and our 
epistemological powers, that participate in the knowledge of reality in a manner 
derived from our being in reality. Being is prior to knowing in this outlook. If we take 
our personal being as primary to knowledge, as seems reasonable enough from an 
epistemological personalists stance, we have no grounds to doubt the priority of 
ontology over epistemology that Augustine holds to. It is just that Augustine has more 
theological courage than us moderns in finding God to be the Personal centre of all 
human being, knowing, saying and relating. Augustine can be situated within the 
same epistemological trajectory as Polanyi, yet culture is never simply the product of 
historically situated human personal beliefs to Augustine, but all culture is grounded 
in the power of being in which human persons exist, the uncreated power that 
transcends humanity and nature. Hence, the belief, culture, history and relationship 
context of all personal knowing (and there is no impersonal knowing) is fully 
embraced by Augustine, yet ultimately real truth is not bounded by the limitations and 
relativities of human culture as Polanyi’s lack of explicit transcendent ontological 
grounding to human knowledge implies.35  
 
 
IV.  Augustinian Personalism and contemporary Western culture 
 
Contemporary Western culture seems to be in something of a crisis of meaning. There 
is no communal coherence underlying the plethora of individual belief assumptions 
about the nature of who we are and what is reasonable to believe regarding truth, 
beauty and the good. Hence, we cannot see how the very notion of ultimate meaning 
can play any culturally unifying role in, for example, civic morality.  We are a people 
without a shared vision of wisdom as we have no public language in which we can 
reasonably debate what ends are intrinsically important in life. We only have the 
appearance of cultural unity in the pragmatic technologies of means – only 
instrumental rationality constitutes public and shared knowledge. 
 
Our deeply culturally embedded assumed philosophy of religion – a philosophy that is 
inherently cosmological, nominalist and secular – leads us to this crisis of meaning 
which is the absence of the very language and political structures of communal 
wisdom.  And it is the “God” of our cultural philosophy of religion, whether believed 
in or not believed in, that sustains the very soul of the life form of late secular 
Western culture.36 The intellectual paradigm of this culture assumes what Milbank 
                                                 
35 Mendelson, M., Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.staford.edu/entries/augustine  
36 Late secularism belongs more to what Middleton and Walsh  (Truth is Stranger Than It Used to Be, 
IVP, USA, 1995, pp 54-55 ) call "hypermodernism" or an intellectual postmodernism shaped by the 
inherent materialism and scepticism of late modernism than to a culturally post modern outlook. David 
Tacey (Re-Enchantment, HarperCollins, Australia, 2000) points out that with a great cultural 
resurgence of interest in "the spiritual", the postmodern outside of academia is often also post-secular. 
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insightfully describes as “methodological atheism”,37 and such a paradigm allows 
God to be a hypothesis for those irrationalists who wish to privately “believe in (the 
existence of) God” as a sheer voluntarist act, but under the law of secular reason, all 
real scholarship for the public domain is methodologically atheistic no matter what a 
scholar’s personal beliefs might be. 
 
But there is hope. What if this hypothetical God does not exist? More to the point, 
what if the hypothetical God of any cosmological philosophy of religion is 
unavoidably a perverse and hubristic idol of the intellect? The clear cultural trend to 
reject both belief and disbelief in the idea of God implied by the assumptions of 
modern Western culture could easily turn into a radical post-secular shift away from 
the philosophy of religion that grounds our cultural atheism. It is worth noting what 
idea of God we no longer believe in. 
 
Personalist epistemology is a critical component in answering the profoundly 
significant epistemological failures of modernism. However, without a personalist 
ontology, personalist epistemology cannot escape cultural relativism which provides it 
with no clear intellectual advantage over impersonalism, which is equally a cultural 
construct. Hence, it seems apparent that Augustinian personalism, which is both 
epistemologically and ontologically personalistic, can provide the grounding for a 
constructive ethical and metaphysical alternative to modernism. In our meaning 
starved and socially atomised cultural environment, the living vision of who God is 
and how we are related to Him and one another in Augustinian personalism may well 
have a cultural appeal and believability that the nearly dead cosmological God cannot 
compete with. 
 
*   *   *   *   *   *   * 
 
                                                 
37 Milbank, J., Theology and Social Theory, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, p 249 
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Plato and Aristotle are the philosophical giants of Classical Western culture, and their 
most profound Christian transformers, Augustine and Aquinas, are the theological 
giants of Western Christendom. Together, there four are peerless in their 
philosophical/theological influence on Western culture.  Respecting this reality, I have 
no desire to deride that great doctor of the Catholic church, Saint Thomas. Tillich also 
had a profound respect for Aquinas. However, Tillich does see Aquinas’ attempt to 
synthesise the idealistic and practical streams of Western thought as a glorious failure 
of the highest intellectual calibre which unfortunately had some devastating 
consequences down the track for Western culture. 
 
Below is my understanding of Tillich’s stance. 
 
Aquinas in seeking to synthesise Platonic Augustinianism with his own Christian 
Aristotelianism runs into a difficult problem. Augustine, in the manner of Plato, leans 
in a dualistic direction wherein the transitory and the contingent gain what meaning 
and reality they have from their participation in the eternal and the unconditioned. 
This is not a dualism of the natural and the supernatural, considered as autonomous 
spheres, and it is not a “Greek” dualism where mind is good and body is evil; rather it 
is a “dualism” where the tangible (eg matter) is derived from and totally dependent on 
the intangible (eg Divine Word), and so truth about the tangible can only be had by 
reference to that intangible reality on which the tangible depends, and not the other 
way around, and certainly not by reference only to the criteria of tangible knowledge. 
In Augustine, in the manner of Plato, revelation directly apprehended by the personal 
and imperishable spirit of a human being, is basic to any genuinely true knowledge. 
Contemplating the transcendentalia is hence basic to anyone’s spiritual, moral and 
intellectual health, and scientia uniformed by sapientia is knowledge only of 
meaningless means without any divinely illuminated knowledge of meaningful ends.  
 
Aristotle and Aquinas are not as sceptical as Plato and Augustine about what can be 
truly learned in the realm of contingent, conditioned tangible perception and abstract 
logic.  Aquinas seeks to overcome Augustine’s “dualism”, elevating nature, as 
perceived by both those with faith and those with no faith, to the realm of revelation 
so that the knowledge of scientia is continuous with the knowledge of sapientia 
making knowledge a seamless unity of spirit and body.  
 
Whilst a theologically framed overcoming of Augustinian “dualism” is Aquinas’ 
intention, his thought opened up two avenues of thinking about knowledge that were 
not open under a more Augustinian and Platonic “dualism”. Firstly, scientia is given a 
sort of autonomous legitimacy regarding practical truths, independent of sapientia. 
That is, natural truths, in their own knowledge terms, are now thought to disclose 
wisdom in a way not compatible with Plato and Augustine’s basic scepticism of the 
sapientia blindness of our merely ratio-epistemological powers. Secondly, given the 
legitimacy of scientia autonomously conceived, the criteria of scientia can be applied 
to the categories of sapientia, and theology can become systematised in the categories 
of science where its objects of observation and logical analysis are not rocks and trees 
but the texts of divine revelation; theology is now the science of God. So Aquinas’ 
thought undermines Augustine’s high and unmediated understanding of the way we 
receive the knowledge of eternal truth, and it can reduce the Augustinian non-
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contingent and essentially revealed knowledge of sapientia to merely ratio-empirical 
terms of scientia as applied to the special revelations held by the church.  
 
Aquinas seeks to keep the theological ontology of Augustine whilst rejecting the 
primacy Augustine gives to the unmediated personalistic epistemology of sapientia. 
But this does not really work as Aquinas ends up holding personalistic ontological 
beliefs that can be savagely critiqued by his epistemological method. Such critique 
was not performed in Aquinas’ day because ecclesial authority in the form of “special 
revelation” was culturally beyond doubt. But when doubt came back to the West with 
the Renaissance, the super-rational category of special revelation could no longer be 
distinguished from merely irrational authority, and the political expression of the 
Church’s beliefs could not be distinguished from the merely tyrannical exercise of 
power. Couple this with the emphasis of individualism and sovereignty in the late 
Middle Ages arising form the nominalists, and special revelation and sheer ecclesial 
power move to shut down newly liberated individual unbelief, and the Augustinian 
understanding of the souls immediate access to divine revelation as carried by the 
Lutherans, clashes catastrophically with the framework of knowledge and authority 
set up in Catholicism after Aquinas. 
 
In attempting to overcoming Augustinian “dualism” where the knowledge of scientia 
is subservient to the knowledge of sapientia, Aquinas creates a new epistemological 
“dualism” where natural revelation is subservient to special revelation. We now have 
the knowledge of Aristotelian scientia with its natural philosophy and theology – 
using the categories of logic and perception – and special knowledge of God mediated 
to the believer by the church. Aquinas hence justifies an unquestionable authority for 
the centralised administration of the Western church, and promotes an Aristotelian 
epistemology of scientia regarding truth and meaning mediated to us through nature.  
 
The culturally Roman concept of centralised ecclesial authority in which Aquinas sits, 
though it had its roots from before the time of Augustine, has proved a great obstacle 
in dealings between Eastern and Western Christianity, was one of the key drivers of 
the Reformation, and was one of the key notions reacted against in the concepts of 
political and religious freedom to emerge out of the Enlightenment. In Aquinan 
ecclesial authority faith and reason are demarcated and yet interlocked in a manner 
that is quite foreign to the way Augustine understood them. 
 
The Aquinan concept of natural knowledge is impersonalist in that knowledge 
presented to the senses and subjected to the criteria of logic is held to give revelation 
about God in a manner that is valid in the terns of impersonally understood (objective) 
categories of the natural powers of the thinking subject. That is, through natural 
revelation I know about God’s necessary existence, and I can know what natural 
moral, logical and scientific truths are, but I know this within my own intellect, and I 
know it in a coldly propositional (objective) manner without relationally and 
immediately knowing God. In contrast Augustine’s knowledge of revelation is 
inherently personal and participatory, and Augustine’s understanding of all so called 
“knowledge” that is not divinely relationally embedded, is that it is inherently 
uncertain. 
 
So Aquinas was never a nominalist, and was always a great admirer and deeply 
intelligent reader of Augustine, and yet his Aristotelian epistemology and his model 
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of ecclesial authority is taken up by nominalists and secularists in a way that 
decisively ends the Augustinian ontological philosophy of religion that had 
underpinned Western culture since the early Middle Ages. 
